The Air Accidents Investigation Branch has released findings from two separate incidents involving easyJet Airbus A320s that took off from incorrect runway intersections at Luton and Manchester airports weeks apart. The investigations reveal a concerning pattern of operational deviation where flight crews calculated performance requirements for full runway takeoffs but then elected to depart from intermediate intersection points, creating margin erosion that exposed both aircraft to unnecessary risk during critical phases of flight.
In the first incident at London Luton Airport, an A320 departed from an unintended runway intersection, with the aircraft reaching just 20 meters above ground level at the very end of the runway before achieving safe climb. The crew had not realised the deviation from their calculated departure point, according to flight data analysis. The second incident occurred weeks later at Manchester Airport, following a similar pattern where intersection bias and habitual decision-making led the crew to use an intersection despite their pre-flight calculations specifying a full runway length requirement. Both occurrences underscore how cognitive habits and confirmation bias can override standardised flight planning procedures, even when the performance data has already been computed.
The Airbus A320 remains one of the world's most widely operated commercial aircraft, with thousands in service across global airline fleets. easyJet operates one of the largest A320 fleets among European carriers, making standardisation and procedure adherence critical to safe operations across its network. The aircraft's performance envelope is well-established, and departure procedures are designed with specific margin requirements that account for aircraft weight, runway surface conditions, atmospheric density, and obstacle clearance. When crews deviate from calculated intersection points to use closer takeoff positions, they systematically reduce the available ground distance for acceleration and rotation, narrowing the buffer between planned and actual performance.
The AAIB's findings highlight that both incidents stemmed not from technical failure or aircraft limitation, but from human factors—specifically the combination of habit and cognitive bias in decision-making. Flight crews routinely become familiar with certain runways and intersection points through repeated operations, and this familiarity can create an unconscious preference that overrides deliberate planning. The fact that both crews had already calculated their performance requirements for full runway operations makes the subsequent intersection departures a clear breach of the planned flight envelope, yet neither crew recognised the discrepancy in real time.
This pattern carries significant safety implications for the industry. Runway intersections exist operationally to optimise airfield throughput and reduce taxi distances, but their use must always remain subordinate to performance calculations and margin requirements. Incidents of this nature indicate a gap between planning discipline and execution discipline—a phenomenon that regulatory bodies and operators worldwide have worked to address through recurrent training emphasis, crew resource management programmes, and procedural reinforcement. The separation between these two easyJet incidents by only weeks suggests either a fleet-wide trend or a systemic training or checklist gap that required immediate attention.
Incidents of this nature typically prompt operators to review intersection departure procedures and crew briefing protocols, reinforcing that calculated performance data should be reconfirmed immediately before takeoff and that any deviation from plan triggers explicit crew coordination and cross-check. The incidents underscore why standardised checklists and sterile cockpit procedures remain essential, even on routine operations at familiar airports. Regulators and industry bodies continue to emphasise that no operational convenience should ever compromise the safety margins that aircraft performance calculations are designed to protect.
Sources: Simple Flying & FlightGlobal. Featured image: AI-generated by AviationShop. By James Holloway.
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