By Elena Vargas
The National Transportation Safety Board has marked 11 of 33 Federal Aviation Administration responses to recommendations from the January 2025 midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) as “Open — Unacceptable Response,” Simple Flying reported on September 15, 2026. The crash between PSA Airlines American Eagle Flight 5342, a Bombardier CRJ-700, and a US Army Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk killed all 67 people aboard and remains the deadliest US aviation accident since November 2001.
The NTSB’s final report issued 50 safety recommendations in total — 33 to the FAA, eight to the Army, five to the Department of Defense Policy Board on Federal Aviation, two to the US Department of Transportation, and one each to the DOT inspector general and RTCA. Most FAA items are already closed as acceptable actions, but the 11 open unacceptable replies cover supervisor time-on-position limits, annual instructor-led threat-and-error-management training, an operational risk-assessment tool for supervisors, objective ATC facility classification criteria, a reassessment of whether DCA tower’s Level 9 designation matches its complexity, post-incident drug-and-alcohol testing procedures and annual training for staff who decide whom to test, a mandate for ADS-B In, a public close-proximity encounter definition and database, prompt near-miss notification while data remain available, and documentation whenever control positions are combined.
ADS-B In is the sharpest fight. Recommendation A-26-031 would require aircraft operating where ADS-B Out is mandatory to also carry ADS-B In with cockpit traffic displays and audible alerts. Investigators calculated that a suitable ADS-B-based system could have alerted the American Eagle crew 59 seconds before impact and the Black Hawk crew 48 seconds before impact. The CRJ’s existing TCAS issued a traffic advisory later, and low-altitude inhibits blocked a resolution advisory that could have commanded an evasive maneuver.
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy asked how many more decades of recommendations after tragedy would pass before ADS-B In is required. Reuters noted the FAA has not committed to writing that rule even while arguing that other work is underway through the end of 2026 and beyond via formal rulemaking or new technical standards. The agency says it went further than one recommendation by suspending visual separation between helicopters and airplanes in busy controlled airspace nationwide in favor of defined radar separation.
Local DCA procedures have already changed: the Route 4 segment between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge is permanently closed, routine mixed helicopter and airline operations are restricted, helicopter zones were moved away from airline paths, visual separation was curtailed, runway restrictions apply during essential helicopter operations, and ADS-B Out around DCA was strengthened with limited exceptions. Yet FAA data reviewed by the NTSB showed 4,067 airplane-helicopter encounters on Routes 1 or 4 from January 2018 through February 2025 with separation of 0.19 miles or less, including 348 cases under 160 yards — evidence the Board cited as proving the hazard was visible for years.
Congress remains split. The Senate’s ROTOR Act with a strong ADS-B In push passed unanimously but fell one vote short of the House two-thirds threshold under expedited rules, while the House ALERT Act passed 396–10 even as the NTSB warned that ADS-B In language still falls short. Aviation safety director Tim LeBaron cautioned against watering down evidence-based recommendations. Families of the 67 victims returned to Capitol Hill this week with Homendy as the Board presses to embed Flight 5342 lessons across the national airspace system, not only inside the District of Columbia.
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